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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
RAYMOND 0. CLUTTER, EDITOR
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO BE HEARD
BY COUNSEL
In Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, Warden,' the relator,
Charles McGlinn, held up the operator of a one-man trolley and was arrested
two or three blocks from the scene of the holdup. He was indicted and
tried on two charges: (a) being armed to rob, and (b) robbery. The
defendant pleaded not guilty, took the witness stand in his own defense, and
testified freely on his own behalf. The jury found him guilty as charged.
Thereupon he was sentenced to the penitentiary.
The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition set
forth that he was "unlawfully restrained and deprived of his liberty" be-
cause he at his trial "did not have counsel; was not represented by counsel,
was not informed of his right to have counsel, did not have counsel ap-
pointed by the court, and did nothing that would waive his constitutional
right to be represented by counsel." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
denied the writ.2
In its decision the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed four United
States Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the defendant for release
from imprisonment by the writ of habeas corpus.' After reviewing the
cases relied upon by the petitioner the court found that none of the cases
would require the court to grant the petitioner a hearing or to release him
from imprisonment. The petitioner was held to have made no showing of
a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
4
The court was of the opinion that the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the cases relied upon by the defendant did not include the
background, experience and conduct of the accused.'
The court indicated that the defendant, with his penitentiary "back-
ground" and his "experience" in the criminal courts must have known that
professional assistance would have been given him upon request and there-
fore he must be deemed to have intelligently waived his "right to be heard
by counsel."' The court concluded that an accused in a criminal case who
is not ignorant of the procedure in the criminal courts when the charge is
other than a capital offense is not deprived of a constitutional right if he
is not informed in advance of his trial that counsel will be assigned him
upon request.
7
The case presents two interesting problems, viz: (a) How do the courts
interpolate the meaning of the constitutional "right to be heard by counsel";
(b) Under what circumstances will the accused be deemed to have "com-
petently and intelligently" waived the constitutional "right to be heard by
counsel" ?"
It is now generally the law in the United States both under the Federal
Constitution and under most State Constitutions, often supplemented by
statutes, that the accused in a criminal case has, and, in the absence of
waiver, cannot be denied the right to have the assistance of, and to be heard
by, counsel in his defense, whether such assistance or hearing is requested
or not, and even though he be without necessary means to employ and com-
pensate an attorney.9 When the accused is unable to employ counsel it is a
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duty imposed on the courts to assign counsel to defend one accused of a
crime; but the exercise of this right may be regulated by reasonable rules
and regulations. It is the usual practice, and frequently a statutory duty
for the court to inform the accused of this right. 0 In some jurisdictions the
right is conferred in capital cases only, though generally it applies in all
criminal cases including misdemeanors. The right includes a fair oppor-
tunity to secure counsel of one's own choice and failure to give the accused
a reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel prior to trial constitutes
a denial of due process of law." It is a general rule that a reasonable time
for the preparation of a defendant's case must be allowed.
2
The court in several jurisdictions, in construing the constitutional or
statutory provisions, guaranteeing to an accused the right to assistance of
counsel, have taken the view that an accused person is entitled to the benefit
of counsel at every stage of a criminal prosecution and to private consultation
with counsel."3 It has-been said in a few cases that the constitutional right
of an accused to be represented by counsel has reference to the trial only,
and that in the absence of a statute, a person accused of an offense is not
entitled as of right to representation by counsel in preliminary proceedings
before a committing magistrate.' 4 However, the rule which now prevails in
most if not all the states is that an accused is entitled, as a matter of con-
stitutional right, to the services of counsel upon his preliminary examination. 5
It appears to be well established that the constitutional right of an
accused in a criminal case to have the assistance of counsel may be waived,
provided it is waived intelligently, understandingly, and in a competent
manner.' 6 But what constitutes waiver is difficult to determine. Whether
one accused of crime has waived his right to the assistance of counsel for his
defense must depend in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused.' 7 It is submitted that the cases may be recapitulated as
follows: In cases where the defendant was a minor convicted of a capital
offense without having been advised of his constitutional privilege to be
represented by counsel, the conviction has been set aside;' 8 a voluntary plea
of guilty constitutes a waiver of the right, but not when the defendant has
been coerced into the plea and was ignorant of his right to legal advice;19
failure to demand an attorney when one is aware or told of the right by the
court is also a waiver ;20 a request to try the case one's self is a waiver.
2
' Of
course the right must be intelligently relinquished. Where the defendant is
foreign, illiterate, feeble-minded or is mentally so deficient as to be incapable
of intelligent waiver, or where his sanity is doubtful, the court must appoint
counsel. 2  A waiver is deemed to have been intelligently made when the
accused has had experience in the procedure of the criminal courts. 23 It is
not necessary that there be a formal waiver. A waiver will ordinarily be
implied where the accused appears without counsel and fails to request or
indicate in any manner a desire that counsel be assigned to him. 4
Obviously, no general rule can be stated categorically. When, however,
all the surrounding circumstances of each case are examined, it appears that
there are several chief factors which may influence the courts. They are:
(1) the gravity of the offense, (2) background, experience, and conduct of
the accused, (3) the knowledge of the law and legal procedure by the accused,
(4) the procedure in the trial court, (5) mental capacity of the accused, and
(6) the age factor.
In view of the previous decisions it seems that the present case was
correctly decided. 25 Certainly the courts should be vigilant and zealous in
the protection of the rights of every individual accused of a crime to see that
he is given a speedy and public trial and opportunity to avail himself of the
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right to be heard by counsel.2" But if the accused competently and intelli-
gently waives this privilege granted to him, the judgment should not be
reversed and a new trial granted on this basis alone.
KENNETH L. HECHT.
1 24 Atl. (2d) I (Penn. 1942).
2 On habeas corpus proceedings two contrary doctrines seem to have developed
in the federal and state courts. One is that the right is so vital and fundamental that
the courts will not imply a waiver, and the other is that if the defendant appears with-
out counsel and does not request appointment of counsel, it is impliedly waived. It is
clear that the courts have a great deal of leeway since each case is to be decided
on its own facts and circumstances and the intelligence and background of the
accused.
3 The four cases are: (1) Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932). (The court was
careful to restrict the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to a "capital" case. The cautious language of the court was as follows: "All
that is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty
of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment
at such a time under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid
in the preparation and trial of the case."); (2) Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458
(1938). (The petitioner had no lawyer present at the trial, and no relatives, friends,
or acquaintances within the state in which he was convicted. He had little education
and was without funds, and had never been guilty of nor charged with any offense
before.); (3) Walker r. Johnson, Warden; 312 U. S. 275 (1941). (The court found
that the petition supported a conclusion that the petitioner desired the aid of counsel,
and so informed the District Attorney, was ignorant of his right to such aid, and
that, by the conduct of the District Attorney, he was deceived and coerced into
pleading guilty when his real desire was to plead not guilty or at least to be advised
by counsel as to his course.); (4) Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941). (The
accused was told orally that the charge was burglary but discovered he had been
duped and inveigled into entering a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary with
explosives.)
4 "Realistically speaking, 'Due process means what the judiciary interprets it to
mean, if counsel can persuade accordingly." Albertsworth, Constitutional Casuistry,
(1932), 27 Ill. L. Rev. 264.
5 The accused previously had been convicted for three separate felonious offenses
for which he had been sentenced to prison.
6 Berry v. State, 61 Ga. App. 315, 6 S.E. (2d) 148 (1939). (Where accused who
had many times before been tried in the same court without any request for counsel
announced ready for trial, failure to appoint counsel to represent him was not a
denial of his constitutional right to benefit of counsel.)
7 "When the fundamental rights of life, or personal liberty of a citizen are at
stake, especially of indigent persons, it is the duty of the court, not only not to mislead
but to inform the accused positively and fully of his basic rights." 121 F. (2d)
865 (C. C. A. Dist. of Col. 1941).
8 For an excellent annotation on both problems see: 84 Law. Ed. 383, 396.
9 Const. of the U. S. (1787) Am. Art. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
The first ten amendments to the United States Constitution are a check upon the
federal government in the exercise of its powers. The Fourteenth Amendment is a
prohibition upon the powers of the States.
10 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 4834. The State of Missouri makes it a misdemeanor,
punishable by fine and imprisonment, for a judge to receive the plea of guilty without
giving the defendant a reasonable time to talk with a friend and an attorney.
11 See 84 A.L.R. 544, for brevity of time between assignment of counsel and trial
as affecting question whether accused is denied right to assistance of counsel.
12 People v. Blumenfeld, 330 Il. 474, 161 N.E. 857 (1928). (Constitutional right
to assistance of counsel includes reasonable time for counsel to prepare defense.)
13 In England it is held that a criminal case cannot be conducted at the same
time both by counsel anid by the dfendant himself, but a defendant may conduct
his case as to matters of fact with the private suggestion of counsel, and as soon as
any point of law arises, his counsel may argue it to the court. Rex v. White, 170 Eng.
Reprints, 1387 (1811).
14 For an illuminating discussion of the common-law background of the duty of




15 Though every person's security against being deprived by state action of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law is under national protection since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment does not profess to secure
to a ersons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.
18 Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 84, 195 S.E. 816 (1938). (Acceptance of law
students, appointed by the court does not constitute waiver of accused's right to
counsel where he did not know that they were not entitled to practice law.)
17 The cases embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought
before a tribunal with power to take his life, or liberty, wherein the prosecution Is
presented by experience and learned counsel.
is Gardner v. The People, 106 Ill. 76 (1883); State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412, 273
P. 490 (1929); But see: People v. Crandell, 270 Mich. 124, 258 N.W. 224 (1985).
(Vigorous dissenting opinion accompanied with extensive authorities.)
19 Chambers v. Florida, 809 U. S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.
278 (1936). (Confession extorted by torture of the accused); People v. Harris, 266
Mich. 317, 253 N.W. 312 (1934).
2o In re Connor, 16 Cal. (2d) 16, 108 P. (2d) 10 (1940) ; Smyth v. State, 124 Neb.
267, 246 N.W. 461 (1933).
21Saldhinger v. The People, 102 Il. 241 (1882) ; Cutts v. State, 84 Fla. 21, 45 So. 491
(1907); People v. Russell, 156 Cal. 450, 105 P. 416 (1909); Dietz v. State, 149 Wis.
462, 186 N.W. 166 (1912); Phillips v. State, 162 Ark. 541, 258 S.W. 403 (1924).
22 Ex Parte Mleadows, 70 Okl. Cr. 304, 106 P. (2d) 139 (1940); People v. Wilson,
29 N.Y.S. (2d) 809, 176 Misc. 1042 (1941); People v. Parcora, 358 Il. 448, 193 N.E.
477 (1984); Lloyd v. State, 206 Ind. 359, 189 N.E. 406 (1984); People v. Salas, 80 Cal.
App. 318, 250 P. 526 (1926).
23Ex Parte Vanderburg, 117 P. (2d) 550 (Okl. Cr. 1941). (Accused had been
before various courts forty times).
24 People v. Harris, 302 I1. 590, 135 N.E. 75 (1922).
25 The cases relied upon by the defendant laid down a rule which has been the
law of Pennsylvania for two hundred and twenty-four years. By the Act of May 31,
1718, 1 Sm. L. 105, sec. 4, 19 P.S. § 783 it was required that "learned counsel" be
assigned to the prisoners "upon all trials" of "capital crimes.' By the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1874) Art. 1 § 9: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and counsel. .
26 State v. Weloon, 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43 (1912). (Where the spectators were per-
mitted to so crowd the court room the counsel could not see the jury or witnesses).
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question: Has a superior officer the authority to dismiss a case where an
arrest has been made by a subordinate?
Answer:
No superior officer should dismiss a case for certainly he has no right to
do so. However, a superior officer is privileged to ask for the dismissal of a
case after a complaint has been filed.
Actually, only a state's attorney or the attorney or counsel of a municipali-
ty may recommend that a case be dismissed. Suppose, however that an arrest
has been made but that no complaint is filed? In such circumstances a superior
officer might be privileged to dismiss the case. But this is a practice that
should not be indulged except in extraordinary circumstances. Even then
the better practice is to advise the state's attorney or municipal attorney.
It should be noted, too, that where an arrest has been made in good faith and
a complaint does not follow the officer might be liable for damages on the
ground of false arrest or of false imprisonment.
For a brief discussion of the principles governing nolle prosequi and
supporting decisions see Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd revision,
Vol. III, p. 2352.-John I. Howe.
